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Introduction
Loss aversion (i.e. the tendency to evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point and be more sensitive to negative departures from this reference point than positive ones) is one of the most well established departures from the expected utility model and it is commonly viewed as an irrational bias. In a survey on loss aversion, Camerer (2005, p.132) states that "loss aversion is often an exaggerated emotional reaction of fear, an adapted response to the prospect of genuine, damaging, survival-threatening loss…Many of the losses people fear the most are not life threatening, but there is no telling that to an emotional system that is overadapted to conveying fear signals." Loss aversion has been linked to many empirical findings in economics and finance including the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler 1995) , selling behavior on housing markets (Genesove and Mayer 2001) and labor supply decisions (Camerer et al. 2007; Fehr and Goette 2007; Crawford and Meng 2011) . Recent evidence from professional golf players on the PGA Tour suggests that not even experience, competition and high stakes seem to extinguish this bias (Pope and Schweitzer 2011) .
In this paper, we argue that making decisions on behalf of others reduces loss aversion. We report experimental evidence from situations with no monetary conflict of interest between the decision maker and the other stakeholders. We administer our experiment to a large subject group randomly drawn from the general Danish population. When choosing between risky prospects with positive outcomes, the decision makers' choices on behalf of others are indistinguishable from choices made on their own behalf. In contrast, when the payoff domain includes losses, we find increased risk taking on behalf of others. Using structural estimation techniques, we find no difference in risk aversion, but significantly lower loss aversion when decisions are made on behalf of others.
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The dual-process model of decision making provides one interpretation of why loss aversion is lower when decisions are made on behalf of others.
According to this model, decisions are driven by an interplay of emotional (affective/hot) and cognitive (deliberative/cold) processes (Kahneman 2003; Loewenstein and O'Donoghue 2004; Rustichini 2008) . 1 It seems plausible that individual decisions and decisions on behalf of others differ with respect to the relative importance of the two systems. Recent neuroeconomic evidence from intertemporal choice situations confirms this view by showing that individuals are less affectively engaged when making decisions for others (Albrecht et al. 2010 ).
Taking a broader perspective, risk-taking on behalf of others is present in many situations. Examples abound and include behavior related to financial investments, management, hiring, traffic and contagious diseases. Indeed, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, actors in the financial sector were accused of excessive risk taking on behalf of others, which spurred a public debate. This underlines the importance of understanding risk taking on behalf of others in general. To this end, the current paper adds to a small but emerging experimental literature on this topic.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss related literature and in section 3 we describe our experimental design. Results are provided in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
1 Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein (2005) put loss aversion in the context of the two-system perspective and ascribe loss aversion to be driven more by affective than deliberate decision making. Sokol-Hessner et al. (2012) provide fMRI evidence that loss aversion is connected to activity in the parts of the brain that are related to affective information processing. we allow decisions errors to be heterogeneous, which is important as error propensities may be treatment dependent.
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Another departure from the previous literature is that we employ a full two-by-two design, in which either the decision maker is paid, one receiver is paid, both are paid or none is paid. This design enables us to obtain proper benchmarks in order to tease out what is driving behavior.
A final contribution of our study is that we employ a "virtual lab" approach by running our experiment over the internet with a large and heterogeneous sample. All previous studies used samples of students and it is well known that student groups may differ from each other with respect to social preferences (see e.g., Fehr et al. 2006 ) and risk preferences (see e.g., von Gaudecker et al. 2012 ).
A virtual lab approach
By applying a "virtual lab" approach we are able to reach a heterogeneous subject pool while maintaining a high level of experimental control. Gaudecker et al. (2012) , who estimate risk preferences both for a student sample in the lab and the general population using the internet-based CentERpanel (a platform that bears close resemblance with the iLEE). They find that the broad population are on average more risk averse and display much more heterogeneity than the student population. However, von Gaudecker et al. (2012) show that these results are driven by socio-economic differences between samples rather than whether the experiments were implemented in the lab or over the internet. 6 The participants could log out at any time and then log in again to continue where they had left off.
7 socioeconomic information provided in the first wave. In total, 740 individuals completed our risk task as decision makers. 
The experimental design
The subjects choose between risky lotteries in a version of the wellestablished multiple price list (MPL) format. Each subject makes choices in 4
MPLs which differ by whether they include the possibility of incurring losses (two MPL do, as explained below). Each subject is assigned to one treatment condition in which decisions may have payoff consequences for others (henceforth denoted as receivers). In particular, we conducted the following four treatments:
1. Individual: Individual decision with payment to the decision maker.
2. Hypothetical: Individual decision without payment.
3. Both: Both the decision maker and the receiver are paid.
Other:
Only the receiver is paid.
Each subject was randomly allocated to one of the four treatments, and in Both and Other they were assigned to be either a decision maker or a receiver.
Each decision maker went through a sequence of the four different lottery screens displayed in Table 2 . Screens 1 and 3 involve the possibility of losses (denoted Loss henceforth), whereas screens 2 and 4 exclude the possibility of losses (denoted NoLoss henceforth). The general structure of each MPL is the same: each lottery screen involves ten decisions between two gambles called the Left gamble and the Right gamble. Each gamble has two different outcomes that occur with probability one half. The Left gamble is constant whereas the payoffs of the Right gamble are increasing.
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The order of screens was randomized and subjects received no information about the outcome of the lottery until all decisions were made. After the experiment, one decision problem was randomly selected to be played out and participants were paid according to the outcome of that gamble. See Online Appendix D for further details about the experiment including a sample of screenshots. 9
The choice to keep the probability fixed at p = 0.5 and vary only the payoffs at each screen has several advantages (similar procedures have been used by e.g., Binswanger 1980 and Tanaka et al. 2010) . Using 50-50 gambles makes the procedure easy to understand. This is especially important in our study, since we targeted a very heterogeneous population. We believe that even though people may have problems interpreting probabilities, the situation in which two outcomes have the same chance of occurring is quite comprehensible also for our subjects. This approach appears to get support from Dave et al. (2010) who find that people with a low level of numeracy may have problems to understand MPL formats with varying probabilities. By keeping probabilities fixed, we disregard potential effects from probability weighting (Quiggin 1982; Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012) .
Our treatments are motivated by our interest in understanding how the risk exposure of a passive receiver affects decision makers' behavior. Indeed, comparing Other with Individual is the main objective for this study, but it should be stressed that this is not straightforward as two things change simultaneously between these two treatments. In particular, the individual incentives are removed when going from Individual to Other, at the same time as the payoff consequences for the receivers are introduced. We therefore ran the Hypothetical and Both treatments. By comparing Hypothetical and Other, we can test how the risk exposure of the passive receiver affects behavior when the decision maker has no individual incentives. Comparing Individual and Both addresses the effect of the risk exposure of the passive receiver while keeping the decisions maker's individual incentives constant. By having these different treatments, it is possible to study "ceteris paribus" changes and thereby reach conclusions about potential causal mechanisms.
Results
In this section, we analyze the data in two steps. First, we compare summary measures of risky choices across treatments. Second, we estimate a structural model of choice that allows us to distinguish between treatment effects on risk aversion and loss aversion.
Descriptive statistics
In total 740 subjects completed the experiment. We exclude subjects whose decision times were among the fastest 10% of the sample because it is highly likely that these just clicked through the screens without paying attention to the content. The remaining 668 decision makers are evenly spread across the four treatments (Individual: 166; Hypothetical: 155; Both: 176;
Other: 171). We begin to analyze the data by studying how many times subjects chose the safe lottery (Nrsafe), i.e., the Left lottery. There is also a difference between Other and Individual (Mann-Whitney test: p-value = 0.071). The difference between Individual and Both is not statistically significant although it lies just above the 10% level (MannWhitney test: p-value = 0.107). In summary, when losses are possible subjects seem to take more risk with other peoples' money. 8 To infer that this change is driven by differences in loss aversion between treatments, we will now employ structural estimation techniques. This allows us to estimate separate treatment effects on risk aversion and loss aversion. 8 It should also be mentioned that there is no evidence that subjects are minimizing the receivers expected payoff in the Other treatment as suggested by the theory of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) . 
Structural estimation
We estimate a structural model under the assumption that individuals have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and display loss aversion. 9 That is, the utility function has the following form
where is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and is the loss aversion parameter. 10 Using the utility function in (1) the expected utility of a lottery A is given by
We define the difference in expected utility between the lotteries Left (L)
and Right (R) as
Acknowledging the stochastic nature of the decision making process, we assume that individuals evaluate differences in expected utility with some noise. More specifically, we utilize the Fechner errors structure that was popularized by Hey and Orme (1994) which states that the L lottery will be chosen if
where is a structural noise parameter. Following Wilcox (2011) we normalize ∆ by dividing with > 0, which is defined as the difference between the maximum utility and the minimum utility over all prizes in each lottery pair. We can then write the likelihood function as
where Φ is the distribution function of the standard normal. We estimate (4) using maximum likelihood methods. The parameters of interest to be estimated are (reflecting risk preferences), (reflecting loss aversion) and (reflecting noise). We estimate average effects, allowing for heterogeneity through the covariates, and cluster standard errors at the individual level.
11 Table 2 presents the results. In Model 1, we let the preference parameters γ and λ depend on treatment and a set of control variables. It is clear from the coefficients of the treatment dummies that the main effects go through the loss aversion parameter. As compared to the baseline Individual treatment, the Hypothetical, Both and Other treatments are all associated with lower loss aversion. These results are confirmed in Model 2, where we also allow for heterogeneity in the noise parameter τ. 12 In the regressions, we control for gender, age, education, cognitive ability and cognitive reflection in all specifications since these have shown to be important determinants of risky behavior in previous studies (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2010; 14 2013a). 13 We confirm previous studies showing that females are more risk and loss averse and that age, education, are closely linked to noisy decision making (Dave et al. 2010; Gaudecker et al. 2011 ). In particular, we corroborate the main results of Andersson et al. (2013a) on that measures of cognitive ability is not related to the curvature of utility function but is strongly related to the noise parameter.
In Online Appendix C we show that our results are essentially identical if we restrict the set of covariates. We also show that the results are unchanged if
we extend the econometric model with a tremble parameter which captures the idea that subjects may tremble and choose one of the lotteries at random. That is, in addition to the Fechner error that depends on the utility difference of the lotteries, subjects have a constant probability of choosing randomly between the lotteries. See Online Appendix C for details and estimation results. 13 Cognitive ability is measured using a progressive matrices test and cognitive reflection is measured using the cognitive reflection test proposed by Frederick (2005) . Both tasks were performed in the first wave of iLEE experiments about two years before our risk task. See Andersson et al. 2013a for more information about the tests. Individual is the baseline treatment. Education1 refers to participants degrees from high school and vocational school, Education2 represents tertiary education up to 4 years and Education3 tertiary education of at least 4 year. Participants with basic schooling (up to 10 years of schooling) are our baseline category. Cognitive ability is measured using a progressive matrices test (the variable ranges between 0 and 19). Cognitive reflection ranges between 0 and 3 and indicate the number of correct answers to the cognitive reflection test proposed by Frederick (2005) . See Andersson et al. 2013a for more details about these tests. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the drop in loss aversion, consider a generalized version of the lottery pairs in Screen 1. A subject make choices between the Left gamble which gives 11 or 65 DKK with equal probability and the Right gamble which gives -25 or with equal probably. Which is then the smallest integer x, that will make a subject prefer the Right lottery? For a subject in the Individual sample with average preference parameters, x is equal to 140, whereas x is equal to 128 in the Other treatment.
14 Another way of quantifying the size of the effect is to measure the impact in terms of Certainty Equivalents (CE). To exemplify, consider Decision 6 on Screen 1, in which x=135. The average subject of the Individual treatment will then choose the Left gamble and the subject of the Other treatment will chose the Right 
Discussion
We think that the decrease in loss aversion is due to two distinct (2012) reports that being accountable for the decisions on behalf of someone else can affect the degree of loss aversion. In addition to a treatment with risk taking on behalf of others they run an accountability treatment in which a fraction of the decision makers had to meet face-to-face with the receivers to explain their decisions. When prospects contain both positive and negative payoffs, such an accountability requirement increases risk taking on behalf of others. They do not find a similar effect for purely positive or purely negative outcomes. Our study differs in that we compare individual decision making to decision making on behalf of others, whereas Phalke et al. (2012) only consider decision making on behalf of others.
moderation of loss aversion is correlated with a decrease in amygdala activity, which is known to be crucial for affective information processing. We conjecture that the same mechanism is at work in our experiment. In particular, in our Both and Other treatment we (implicitly) ask decision makers to take a different perspective by letting them make decisions on behalf of others and it is likely that this induces the same dampening of activity in amygdala. 16 Further support for this interpretation comes from Albrecht et al. (2010) , who present fMRI evidence from intertemporal decisions tasks. The results indicate that decision makers show less affective engagement when decisions are made on behalf of others.
Conclusion
This paper investigates experimentally how people take risks on behalf of others, which is an issue of general importance. The experimental method is well suited for addressing this question since it allows for investigations of controlled variation in incentives while holding constant the multitude of contextual factors that surround these decisions outside the lab.
When losses are excluded, subjects choose about the same risk exposure when they decide for themselves, for some other person or for themselves together with another person. 17 When losses are possible, we find that decision makers are less loss averse when they also decide for someone else. Loss aversion is generally viewed as a bias, and decision making on behalf of others reduces this bias and bring decisions closer to rationality. The mechanism 16 If this conjecture holds then it might also offer an explanation to the group identity effects discussed earlier. 17 The absence of conflicts of interests seems to be crucial for the moral imperative to be effective. In a companion paper (Andersson et al. 2013b) we investigate behavior when the decision maker is facing hedged payoff schemes or has to compete for reimbursement. Under those circumstances we find evidence for increased risk taking on behalf of others also in gambles with positive outcomes.
behind this effect may be that people make more "dispassionate" choices when they put themselves into the shoes of others. This interpretation is in line with recent findings in neuroeconomics (e.g., Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009 .
It should be stressed that loss aversion is costly because people shy away from profitable investments. The reason is that losses loom large in people's minds when making choices on their own. But when making choices on behalf of others, losses are less salient and people therefore make more rational choices. In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that representative decision making is not necessarily a bad thing, for domains without losses conscientious decision making is observed and for domains with losses it can help to reduce a well-known bias.
Online Appendix
This document contains additional material to accompany "Deciding for 
A. Comparison with the Danish population

B. Additional statistical analysis
In this appendix, we provide some additional descriptions and analysis of our data. Table B1 reports the average number of safe choices by treatment and screen type. 
C. Additional structural estimation results
In Table C1 we present structural estimation results based on a restricted set of covariates. The main results presented in the text continue to hold also for this specification. Table C2 and Table C3 contains estimation results based on an alternative error model. We have added a tremble probability to the contextual utility specification. The tremble parameter captures the idea that subjects err and choose one of the lotteries at random. That is, in contrast to the contextual error, the probability of making a mistake due to trembles is independent of the utility difference between the lotteries. The probability of choosing the left lottery is given by:
The treatment effects presented in Tables C2-C3 are nearly identical to those presented in Table 2 of the paper. 
D. Experimental design and screenshots
In this appendix, we provide additional details about the design of the experiment.
Description
In short, participants repeatedly choose between a pair of lotteries ("left"
vs. "right"). Each lottery has two possible outcomes which are equally likely (explained to subjects as a coin toss). Lotteries are presented in tables in which there are 10 choices to make (see Table 2 of the main text for the different payoff configurations used). In total, there are 4 tables which were presented in random order. The structure of the tables is such that the "left" option is relatively safe (possible payoffs are similar) and payoffs of the left option do not vary across choices (i.e. within a table). In the "right" option, the low payoff is held constant within a table but the high payoff varies systematically.
Participants are paid according to one of the choices. Losses were possible in this module. Losses, if any, were deducted from gains in other modules.
Payoffs across modules were calibrated such that it was not possible for subjects to incur losses over the entire iLEE3 wave.
There are four treatments:
• Individual: The decision maker´s (DM) choice only affects payoff of the DM.
• Hypothetical. DM is asked to make choices as if she was paid, but no payment is actually made.
• Both: DM choice affects DM and one other participant. Half of the participants are "receivers", the other half are DM. The DM makes the choices in the four tables, the receivers do not make choices.
• Other: DM choice does not affect DM payoff but does affect the payoff of one other participant. Half the subjects are DM, the other half are receivers.
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The allocation to the treatments was randomized. Roles are assigned ex ante in treatments Both and Other, i.e. receivers do not make choices and are directly routed to the next module.
One of the choices in one of the tables was chosen at random to be payoff relevant, and a random draw determined the earnings of the participant(s).
Matching occurred within the treatments (four DM had to be matched twice because there were more receivers than decision makers). Average earnings were DKK 45.5 in this module (average also includes DM in Hypothetical and
Other who did not receive any payment from this module).
The screens were presented in the order shown below. 
Translation of Instruction screen 1 (treatment Both)
In this part of the experiment a decision maker will make 40 choices for himself/herself and another random participant (a receiver).
Each choice is between two different games of heads or tails. The decision maker each time has to indicate if he/she prefers the game to the LEFT or the game to the RIGHT. Each game has two possible outcomes, head or tail.
The outcome is random and with equal probabilities.
One of the 40 choices between the two different games of heads or tails will be chosen randomly for payment. The game, which the decision maker chooses to play, will be played and the payment for both the decision maker and the receiver will depend on the outcome from either HEAD or TAIL. Some of the games can result in negative payment. In the case that a game with negative payment has been chosen for payment, the amount will be drawn from both the account of the decision maker and the receiver. All choices have equal probabilities to be selected for payment.
Here is one example.
If the decision maker chooses the game to the LEFT the decision maker and the receiver will each win 30 kr., if the outcome is HEAD, and 50 kr., if the outcome is TAIL. If the decision maker chooses the game to the RIGHT the decision maker and the receiver each lose 10 kr., if the outcome is HEAD, but win 80 kr., if the outcome is TAIL.
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The decision maker therefore chooses the game on behalf of himself/herself and the receiver.
Which role, decision maker or receiver, you will get will be determined randomly. You are as likely to become the decision maker as you are to become the receiver. When the roles have been determined, each decision maker will be matched randomly with a receiver.
On the next screen you will be informed whether you have been chosen to become a decision maker or a receiver.
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Sample Instruction screen 2 (treatment Both)
Translation of Instruction screen 2 (treatment Both)
Your role
You have randomly been chosen to be a receiver. You will be matched with a random chosen decision maker.
You therefore have no choices to make. Your payment from this part of the experiment will depend on the choices of the other participant.
